Q.
In general sense and also in legal diction, jurisdiction means "to hear and determine a cause applying judicial powers in relation to it." So jurisdiction can be termed as to decide a particular causes of action/dispute of civil nature where the competent court having right to hear and determine it, disposes of the issue/dispute acting under its judicial powers.
In case of Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, MANU/SC/0240/1968 : AIR 1969 SC 823: (1969) 3 SCR 92, after referring to various decisions, the Supreme Court observed, "jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the issue/ dispute, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties."
Section 9 - Courts to try all suits
"The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is expressly a impliedly barred".
Explanation I.--
A suit in which the right to property or to office is contended is a suit of civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of the questions as to religions rites or ceremonies.
Explanation II.--
For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fee is attached to the office referred in Explanation I or whether or not such office is to a particular office.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 confers the power upon the civil court to try all suits of civil nature unless barred by the express provisions. For the adjudication of such suits of civil nature as described under section 9, it is not the status of the parties to the suit, but the subject-matter of it, which determines whether or not the suit is of civil nature.
Again the parties are not at liberty to choose or by mutual consent to diminish the jurisdiction of a competent court. The principle is well-settled that consent cannot confer or take away jurisdiction of a court.
In case of D. Joshi v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, AIR 2011 SC 848 it was held that "all courts are Tribunals. But Tribunal, unless it has all trappings of court is not court".
In case of Satguru Construction Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd., (2007) 5 AIR Bom 37 it was held that non-pleading of issue of jurisdiction at initial stage will not clothe Civil Courts with jurisdiction when expressly barred under any Act.
For jurisdiction of court the existing law on date of institution of suit or on date on which suit comes up for hearing, will be applied. Further if Court has jurisdiction to try the suit when it comes for disposal, it then cannot refuse to assume jurisdiction by reason of the fact that it has no jurisdiction to entertain it at the date of institution of suit. Sudhir G. Angur v. M. Sanjeev, MANU/SC/1647/2005 : (2006) 1 SCC 141.
It was observed in case of Chiranjilal Shrilal v. Jasjit Singh, MANU/SC/0496/1993 : (1993) 2 SCC 507: 1993 (2) ALT 13 (SC): 1993 (2) BLJR 1193: JT 1993 (2) SC 341: (1993) 2 SCALE 146: (1993) 2 SCR 454 that: "If the Court has no inherent jurisdiction, neither acquiescence nor waiver nor estoppel can create it." It means that a defect in jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the authority of the court to pass a decree. A decree passed without jurisdiction is non est and its validity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage of execution or in collateral proceedings.
It simply implies is that the court should have competent authority or jurisdiction to set off the dispute in question.
In the leading case of Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, MANU/SC/0116/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 340: 1954 (2) BLJR 426: (1955) 1 SCR 117, the Supreme Court observed: "A defect of jurisdiction......strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of the parties."
In J. Kumaradasan Nair v. IRIC Sohan, MANU/SC/0186/2009 : AIR 2009 SC 1333, the Supreme Court held that mentioning of a wrong provisions on non-mentioning of any provisions of law would, by itself, be not sufficient to take away the jurisdiction of a court if it is otherwise vested in it in law. While exercising its power, the court will merely consider whether it has the source to exercise such power or not. They will not apply the beneficient provisions in a padantic manner. When the provisions are meant to apply and in fact found to be applicable to the facts and circumstances of a case, there is no reason as to why the court will refuse to apply the same only because a wrong provisions has been mentioned.
In Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santosh Kumari, MANU/SC/7929/2007 : AIR 2008 SC 171, the Supreme Court held that the Courts in India exercise jurisdiction both in equity as well as law but exercise of equity jurisdiction is always subject to the provisions of law. Such jurisdiction can be exercised only when no law operates in the field.
Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and meaning of Suits of Civil Nature
As we have earlier seen that under section 9 of the Code courts are authorised to entertain the suit of civil nature (if name adjudicate them) unless barred expressly.
A thorough interpretation of section 9 puts two basic conditions to test that whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to try a suit or not.
(i) The suit must be of civil nature; and
(ii) The cognizance of such a suit should not have been expressly or impliedly barred.
So a suit to establish a person's right to enter a religious place and suit to restrain the defendant from entering a place of worship are both, entertainable being suits of civil nature. The basic test is that whether a person's civil right is affected or abridged by a particular act of a party or an institution and secondly whether the Courts are expressly barred to take such a particular issue for adjudication or not. Once it is settled that the suit/dispute is of a civil nature and the concerned court is not expressly barred to adjudicate the issue in question, the Court is supposed to have competent jurisdiction to determine the issue.
Explaining the concept of jurisdiction of Civil Court(s) under section 9, in P.M.A. Metropolitan v. M.M. Marthoma, MANU/SC/0407/1995 : AIR 1995 SC 2001: JT 1995 (5) SC 1: (1995) 4 SCALE 1: 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286: (1995) Supp 1 SCR 542 (a leading decision), the Supreme Court stated:--The section would, therefore, be available in every case where the dispute was of the characteristic of affecting one's rights which are not only civil but of civil nature."
(a) suits relating to right to property;
(b) suits relating to right of worship;
(c) suits relating to right of religious procession;
(d) suits relating to right of shares in offerings;
(e) suits relating to civil wrongs;
(f) for breach of contract;
(g) suits for rights to hereditary offices.
(a) Suits involving principally the question of caste;
(b) Suits involving principally religious rites and ceremonies;
(c) Suits against expulsion from caste;
(d) upholding mere dignity or honour, etc.
Q.
Jurisdiction of a Court may be classified under the following categories:
(1) Territorial or local jurisdiction.--
Every court is competent to adjudicate the matters/issues falling under the local limits of its jurisdiction. For example, the District Judge has to exercise the jurisdiction within his district and not outside it unless barred by pecuniary jurisdiction. And the High Court has jurisdiction over the issues relating to the concerned state.
For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the Court only because two causes-of-action joined in terms of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the same would not mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect of one cause-of-action and not the other. Recourse to the additional forum, however, may be taken if both the causes of action arise within the jurisdiction of the court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the issues; Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, MANU/SC/2524/2005 : AIR 2006 SC 730: 2006 (1) ALD 138 (SC): 2006 (1) AWC 864 (SC): 2006 (1) BLJR 29: JT 2006 (1) SC 123: (2006) 1 MLJ 36 (SC): 2006 (32) PTC 1 (SC): RLW 2006 (1) SC 543: MANU/SC/2524/2005 : (2006) 9 SCC 41.
(2) Pecuniary jurisdiction.--
The Code provides that a court will have jurisdiction only over those suits, the amount or value of the subject matter of which does not exceeds the limit of the jurisdiction. Thus, a Presidency Small Causes Court cannot entertain a suit in which the amount claimed exceeds Rs. 1000.
(3) jurisdiction as to subject-matter.--
A court cannot entertain and adjudicate an issue which does not fall within its competency as to competency over the matter. Thus, the Presidency Small Causes Court has not jurisdiction to try suit, for specific performance of a contract, partition of immovable property for closure or redemption of a mortgage, etc.
Similarly, in respect of testamentary matters, divorce cases, probate proceedings, the Court of District Judge has exclusive jurisdiction.
(4) Original and appellate jurisdiction.--
In the exercise of original jurisdiction, a court entertains and decides suits and in its appellates jurisdiction, it entertains and decides appeals. District Courts and High Court have original as well as appellate jurisdiction.
In, State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by LRs., MANU/SC/0238/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 2220: 2001 (1) BLJR 473: JT 2000 (4) SC 157: (2000) 3 SCALE 61: MANU/SC/0238/2000 : (2000) 3 SCC 689: (2000) 2 SCR 937, the facts are, the Manjeti Venkata Rao and Manjeti Kanta Rao filed a suit against the State of Andhra Pradesh for a declaration that the property comprised in R.S. No. 400 with a building thereon in which plaintiffs have a half share is not subject to any public or charitable trust of endowment and that the order G.O. Ms No. 1501, dated 12th July, 1979 is void.
The Trial Court framed several issues and on all issues held against the plaintiff. The two appeals filed in High Court against the judgment of Trial Court were dismissed. There upon two Letter Patent Appeals were filed. The contentions in Letter Patents Appeal were--
(i) The order under section 77 of the A.P. Charitable and Hindu Religious Endowment, 1966 does not affect a decision rendered in civil suit No. 11/67 inasmuch as question of title had been raised in the suit.
(ii) The order under section 77 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986 and the suit had been decided by competent authority and, therefore proceeding under section 77 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act could not operate as res judicata.
(iii) To challenge an order under section 77 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986, a suit was required to be filed under section 78 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, the Court would construe the suit out of which appeal itself arises under section 77 of the Act.
The Supreme Court made following observations:
The suit was filed prior to initiation of proceedings under section 77 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986 and, therefore, the said suit cannot be a suit contemplated under section 78 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986. The order under section 77 is conclusive which determined the issue that the suit property is not subject to public charily or endowment unholding the case of defendants 4 to 12 that property is private property and is not an endowment. Such a question could have been decided in a proceeding under section 77(1)(d) of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986 as to whether any property is endowment and, if so, whether it is charitable or religious endowment. A person aggrieved could file a suit under section 78 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986. Since no suit was filed the declaration made by Deputy Commissioner under section 77 and order made by him concluded the issue whether or not the suit property is charitable or religious endowment. With the coming in force of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986, the Deputy Commissioner considered the very question raised in the suit as to nature of the suit property and held that it is private property and having concluded as public charity or endowment that conclusion became final.
The Deputy Commissioner having followed due procedure made the order and that order could have been challenged as provided under section 78 of the A.P. Religious Endowment Act, 1986 by way of suit or by an appeal when neither of these courses were adopted, the order made by the authority in its special jurisdiction must be held to be conclusive and final. Therefore, view taken by High Court appears to be correct and the appeals are dismissed.
On the point of the law is section 9, the Supreme Court stated:
"The normal line of law is the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but such exclusion is not readily inferred and presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is:
(i) Whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication?
(ii) Whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party arrived by an order made under it?
Q.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Where the statute gives finality to the order of the special tribunals jurisdiction of the Civil Courts must beheld to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in suit. Such provision, however does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act, have been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
In Gundaji Satwaji Shinde v. Ram Chandra Bhikaji Joshi, MANU/SC/0307/1978 : AIR 1979 SC 653: (1979) 2 SCC 459: (1979) 2 SCR 586, the Supreme Court observed as that, the dispute in the suit was whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide that: "Plaintiff being agriculturist or not". The plaintiff's contention was that the fact whether he was an agriculturist or not was an issue which could be decided by the competent authority, i.e., "Mamlatdar", and that the Civil Courts would have no jurisdiction to decide that issue at all.
The Trial Court and later High Court both rejected the contentions of the plaintiff who came to the Supreme Court.
Decision by Supreme Court:
Both on principle and on authority there is no escape from the conclusion that where in a suit properly constituted and cognizable by the Civil Court upon a contest an issue arises which is required to be decided by competent authority under the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide or deal with the same is not only ousted but the Civil Court is under a statutory obligation to refer the issue to the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, to decide the same and thus dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the competent authority.
It is incumbent upon the Civil Court to refer the issue to Mamlatdar (competent authority) under the Tenancy Act and the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide and deal with the same.
In Shriram City Union Finance Corp. v. Rama Mishra, MANU/SC/2500/2000 : AIR 2002 SC 2402: (2002) 9 SCC 613, the facts of the case was, the respondent obtained a bus on lease for a period of 36 months. The lease period came to an end on 14th August, 2000. The respondent defaulted in making the payment of instalments in spite of demand made by appellants.
As per clause 33 of agreement (b/w appellant and respondent) the matter was referred to sole arbitrator, an advocate of Calcutta for deciding dispute. In spite of notice respondent did not appear. The appellant made an application to city Civil Court for appointment of receiver for taking possession of the said vehicle, who was appointed. The arbitrator passed an award in favour of appellant and consequently the receiver took over the possession of the said vehicle in December 1998.
The respondent filed suit for injunction in the court of civil judge (junior division) Bhubaneshwar challenging that repossession of vehicle was illegal and redeliver direction along with fixing rescheduling of payment due as against the respondent. The appellant raised an important question of jurisdiction as specific clause of agreement stated that court at Calcutta will have jurisdiction to decide a dispute arising out of this conflict.
© Universal law Publishing Co.